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PHASED RETIREMENT PROGRAMS FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
WORKPLACE
PAMELA PERUN*
Private institutional arrangements and public policies
encourage early retirement and inhibit flexible retirement
arrangements that may involve working less than full-time. But
if, even in the face of such disincentives, the employer and
employee wished to negotiate a more gradual transition out of the
labor force, they would face a number of discouraging legal and
regulatory hurdles that were created in the past with the best of
intentions.
The notion that our laws and regulations should be designed
to facilitate phased retirement represents a 180-degree shift in
traditional benefits thinking. For decades, employers have looked
for benefits tools to ease older workers out of the workforce, either
to implement downsizing or to make room for the huge cohort of
baby boomers who were eager to work their way up the career
ladder. Consequently, there is a large legal apparatus governing
employee benefit programs that controls when and how this can be
done. This apparatus was constructed over many years as part of
a developing consensus over how employer and employee needs
should be balanced. There is no similar apparatus for phased
retirement programs, and much of the current apparatus is in fact
an impediment.
Ideally, a phased retirement program should be a routine
employee benefit program that permits employees to adjust their
work hours and responsibilities gradually as they transition to full
retirement.' Its compensation and benefits-both pension and
*This research has been supported by a grant from the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and
should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees or its funders. An
earlier version of this paper can be found in Rudolph G. Penner, Pamela Perun
and Eugene Steuerle, Legal and Institutional Impediments to Partial
Retirement and Part-Time Work by Older Workers, Washington, D.C.: THE
URBAN INSTITUTE, 2002. I thank Professors Jonathan Barry Forman and
Norman P. Stein and my colleagues at the Urban Institute, Rudy Penner and
Gene Steuerle, for their much appreciated assistance, comments, and
suggestions.
1. There are a number of good reports and analyses currently available on
the issue of phased retirement. Among them are: The Working Group Report
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welfare-structure should be flexible. It should provide employers
with reasonable and predictable costs, minimal administrative
responsibilities, and legal protection against claims for age
discrimination. It should enable employees to make an informed
decision about participating and maintain current law protections
for older workers, particularly for those who must work out of
financial necessity.
This article examines the legal issues impeding the
development of phased retirement programs. The first section
describes the three major laws that govern employee benefits and
the features of those laws that most conflict with the objectives of
phased retirement programs. It also describes how similar issues
were resolved when early retirement programs were first
developed on a large scale a decade ago. The next section explores
the legal issues in the design of phased retirement programs from
the perspective of the employer and discusses strategies that
appear to be successful, although they are available only to a
select group of employers.
The article then reviews phased
retirement programs from the perspective of the employee and
describes some of their drawbacks. In the final section, a number
of policy options for changing current law are considered. The
article concludes with some recommendations for change-from
relatively easy to accomplish regulatory changes to extensive
statutory changes-that could be adopted to accelerate the
development of phased retirement programs.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
To design a phased retirement program, an employer has to
answer three basic questions. How will the work arrangement be
structured?
Which employees should be eligible?
How will
employees be paid? An employer's answer to these questions will
have important legal implications. Phased retirement programs,
with some limited exceptions, will fall within the category of
employee benefit programs. By any standard, such programs are
heavily regulated by multiple statutes and complicated
regulations. The relevant statutes are designed for different
purposes but a common theme-the protection of employees-is
prominent in each.
on Phased Retirement, submitted to the ERISA Advisory Council of the United
States Department of Labor, Nov. 14, 2000 available at http://www.dol.gov/
pwba/adcoun/phasedrl.htm (last visited June 8, 2002); Adrien R.
LaBombarde, Can Phased Retirement Really Work?, Milliman & Robertson,
BENEFITS PERSP. UPDATE, May 2001 available at http://www.milliman.com/

files/PUp_0501_arLphased.pdf (last visited June 8, 2002); and David Rajnes,
Phased Retirement: Leaving the Labor Force, EBRI NEWSL., vol. 22, no. 9,
September 2001, available at http://www.ebri.org/notesx/0901note.htm (last

visited June 8, 2002).
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This section briefly describes the major federal laws that
control employee benefit plans and their pertinent features for
purposes of phased retirement programs.
It concludes by
illustrating how a similar initiative for early retirement programs
might serve as a model for legal changes to spur the
implementation of phased retirement programs.
A. Special Benefits Statutes: The Tax Code and ERISA
Because they receive special tax benefits, employee benefit
plans are subject to special rules in the Internal Revenue Code.'
In addition, they are generally also subject to the federal labor law
known as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") whose purpose is to secure the benefits promised
employees in employer-sponsored plans. Nothing in ERISA or the
Code requires employers to establish benefit plans or mandates
the types of benefits those plans must offer. But both statutes play
a critical role in structuring the plans of employers who choose to
do so.
Not all plans and not all employers are subject to the full
array of regulation. The plans sponsored by state and local
governments and other public authorities are exempt from ERISA
as well as many important Code rules and are regulated instead
by state law.4 A second exception applies to the type of plan. As a
general rule, plans which pay health, life insurance or similar
benefits, so called "welfare" benefits, are subject to much less
regulation and scrutiny than plans that pay retirement benefits.
Employers have almost complete discretion over which employees
will be covered and what benefits will be offered in welfare plans.
In addition, employees have no vested rights to benefits in these
plans so employers are free to change these plan as they see fit.
Both the Code and ERISA provide employers who include welfare
benefits in their phased retirement programs with the maximum
amount of flexibility.

Exhibit 1. Restrictions on Employer Flexibility
A welfare plan has few restrictions but:
a retirement plan may impose only minimum age and service
standards for participation;

2. The Internal Revenue Code shall be referred to as either the I.R.C. or
the Code within the text.
3. This act shall be abbreviated as ERISA throughout the text, and the act
and its subsections shall be alternatively referred to as ERISA or Title 29 of
the United States Code (29 U.S.C.) in the notes.
4. ERISA § 4(b) (2002).
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" a retirement plan must cover a high proportion of low-paid

workers;
* a retirement plan may not pay disproportionate benefits to
high-paid workers;
" a retirement plan must have standard rules for how all
participants will accrue benefits in a pension plan and
receive contributions in a profit-sharing plan;
* a retirement plan's other benefits, rights and features such as
loans, forms of distributions, early retirement subsidies,
rights to make and receive contributions, and so on, must
generally be available to all participants;
• a retirement plan must have a standard schedule for vesting;
and
* a retirement plan may not reduce or eliminate vested benefits

The opposite is true of retirement plans sponsored by private
employers. Their regulatory structure reflects a philosophy that
employers should be required to make their plans as uniform as
possible and include a broad group of employees. As a result,
employer flexibility in retirement plan design is limited. A
particular plan must satisfy complicated, mathematical nondiscrimination tests. Exhibit 1 illustrates some of the constraints
imposed on employer discretion in retirement plan design. The
rationale for these rules originates in the Code and reflects the
sentiment that the tax benefits available through retirement plans
should not disproportionately benefit higher-paid employees. 5
Through the passage of ERISA in 1974 and subsequent legislation,
benefit law has increasingly required employers to adhere to rules
promoting uniformity and standardization in the treatment of
employees and types of benefits offered. As a result, as a general
rule, employers find it all but impossible to create benefits
specifically for special groups of workers - whether they are older
workers, younger workers, or any other specific category of
workers.
Technical tax rules also complicate the regulatory landscape
for phased retirement programs. Here the problem is not too
much uniformity but too little. Under most scenarios, these
programs would anticipate relying on retirement plans to provide
supplemental income to part-time retirees. But not all plans are
capable of providing this income. Tax law, very early on, divided
the retirement plan universe into two types: pension plans and
5. These rules were first enacted in the Revenue Act of 1940 in an effort to
ensure that a plan would cover a reasonable proportion (a "good group") of an
employer's workforce and would not skew its benefits or contributions to
owners, executives and other highly-paid employees. These rules have been
elaborated and increasingly tightened in subsequent amendments to the Code.
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profit-sharing plans.6 Today, this distinction has lost most of its
popular meaning as both types of plans provide retirement income.
As a legal matter, however, the distinction is still critical,
controlling important plan features such as when benefits may be
paid. As a result, this distinction between plan types has a major
impact on the design of phased retirement programs.
So-called pension plans are defined in regulations as those
intended to pay benefits "over a period of years, usually for life,
after retirement." They have two basic forms: (1) defined benefit
plans, including hybrid defined benefit plans such as cash balance
plans; and (2) money purchase pension plans that are defined
contribution plans with a set contribution formula. Profit-sharing
plans are now the most common form of retirement plan.8
Although they were originally created to enable employees to
participate in the profits of their employer, employers are no
longer required to have profits before making plan contributions.
Profit-sharing plans have two basic forms: stock bonus plans,
including employee stock ownership plans, and profit-sharing
plans that include the popular 401(k) plan. Profit-sharing plans
permit employers, and employees in the case of 401(k) plans, to
decide each year how much, if anything, they will contribute,
subject to Code limits.

Exhibit 2. Pension Plans:
" may not pay benefits before the "normal" retirement age;
" the employer decides when normal retirement age occurs;
" defined benefit plans are generally required to calculate
benefits as beginning at age 65;
" age 65 used to be the normal retirement age for full Social
Security benefits;
" age 65 is the customary, but not legally required, normal
retirement age in pension plans;
" most pension plans cannot pay benefits to current employees
before age 65;

Because pension plans are designed to pay retirement income,
their ability to pay in-service benefits to employees is limited. The
6. This distinction has been in existence ever since retirement plans were
first invented in the late 1800s. The latest IRS position on this issue was
adopted in 1956 and can be found at Treasury Regulations § 1.401-1.

26

C.F.R. § 1.401-1 (2002).
7. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1 (2002).
8. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, employers could make
contributions to their profit-sharing plans only in years in which they had
actual profits. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(27)(A) (2000).
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Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has interpreted the "retirement
income" restriction in pension plans to prohibit payment of
benefits, other than disability and death benefits, before an
employee terminates employment or the plan itself is terminated.9
As Exhibit 2 illustrates, employers have traditionally chosen age
65 as normal retirement age, although previous studies showed
that the design of defined benefit plans may actually encourage
retirement before the normal retirement age.10 Pension law does
not mandate age sixty-five as normal retirement age but generally
does require defined benefit plans to express benefits as an annual
amount beginning, for most employees, no later than age sixtyfive.
Most employers choose age sixty-five as the normal
retirement age in their plans in order to satisfy this rule easily
and because, until recently, age sixty-five was the traditional age
for retiring and receiving full Social Security benefits.
Profit-sharing plans are not prohibited from paying benefits
to current employees, and employers can choose to include a
number of different distribution options in their plans. 1 The
technical rule is that these plans may pay benefits "after a fixed
number of years, the attainment of a stated age, or upon the prior
occurrence of some event such as layoff, illness, disability,
retirement, death, or severance of employment." 2 Exhibit 3
illustrates the types of distribution options typically available. Tax
law, however, does make a distinction between contributions made
by employers and employees and imposes special limits, for
example, on 401(k) contributions. A 401(k) plan may not allow
current employees withdraw their own contributions prior to age
fifty-nine and one-half. Younger employees may only get access to
9. Rev. Rul. 56-693, 1956-2 CB 282, available at http://www.taxlinks.com/
rulings/1956/revrul56-693.htm (last visited June 8, 2002).
10. See generally Daniel Dulitzky, Incentives for Early Retirement in
Private Pension and Health Insurance Plans, in The Retirement Project, Brief
No. 3, March, 1999, Washington, DC: URB. INST., at http://www.urban.org/

retirement/briefs/3/brief 3.html (last visited July 31, 2002); Laurence Kotlikoff
& David Wise, Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plans, in THE
ECON. AGING (David Wise, ed., 1989); Laurence Kotlikoff & David Wise, The
Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans, in ISSUES IN PENSION ECONOMICS,

(Zvi Bodie, John Shoven & David Wise, eds., 1987); Laurence Kotlikoff &
David Wise, Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans:
Evidence for Contractual versus Spot Labor Markets, in PENSIONS, LAB., &

INDIVIDUAL CHOICE (David Wise, ed., 1985); and James Stock & David Wise,
The Pension Inducement to Retire:An Option Value Analysis in ISSUES ECON.
AGING (David Wise, ed., 1990); See also Rudolph G. Penner, Pamela Perun &
Eugene Steuerle, Legal and Institutional Impediments to PartialRetirement
and Part-Time Work by Older Workers, Washington, D.C.: THE URBAN
INSTITUTE, 2002.

11. Each distribution option adds a layer of complexity and contributes to
the record-keeping burden of plan administration that so few employers
permit the maximum number of distribution events in their plans.
12. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(ii) (2002).
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their own funds by taking a loan from the plan or by qualifying for
a small "financial hardship" distribution in a limited number of
circumstances.

Exhibit 3. Profit-Sharing Plans may allow current employees:
" to withdraw employer contributions after 2 years;
• to withdraw employer contributions after 5 years of plan
participation;
• to withdraw employer contributions at any age;
• to withdraw contributions on account of financial hardship
" to take a loan;
• but not to withdraw 401(k) contributions (employee
contributions) before age 591 .

Tax law contains an additional disincentive to early
Employees
participation in a phased retirement program.
normally pay regular income tax when they withdraw funds from
retirement plans. But current employees who take withdrawals
before age fifty-nine and one-half pay an additional ten percent
excise tax in addition to regular income tax, unless they lock
themselves into withdrawals in the form of lifetime annuity
payments.13 Employees who quit after age fifty-five and take any
form of withdrawal are not required to pay this extra tax.
This combination of plan distribution restrictions and extra
tax penalties can make employees reluctant to participate in a
phased retirement program with their current employer. For
example, in a defined benefit plan, many employees under age
sixty-five will find switching to part-time work in a phased
retirement arrangement unattractive because they can not begin
receiving pension payments as supplemental wages until age
sixty-five. Employers could, of course, choose a lower "normal"
retirement age to facilitate earlier distributions, but that would
accelerate the accrual and therefore the cost, of benefits for all
participants. Some have suggested, however, that liberalizing this
restriction to promote phased retirement programs is warranted.
The "Phased Retirement Liberalization Bill" was introduced in the
last session of Congress to permit pension plans to provide inservice distributions after attainment of age fifty-nine and onehalf or completion of thirty years of service. By enabling defined
benefit plans to make payments to current employees before
normal retirement age, such legislation would facilitate phased
retirement programs.14 In a profit-sharing plan, many employees
13. I.R.C. § 72(t) (200).
14. The "Phased Retirement Liberalization Bill" was introduced in the
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who have not reached age fifty-nine and one-half also have little
incentive to stay with their current employer in a part-time work
arrangement. If they quit, they not only can get complete access to
their own 401(k) contributions as well as their employers'
contributions, but they also avoid a ten percent penalty tax on
their withdrawals if they are at least fifty-five years old.
As a result, many employees who might otherwise prefer to
remain with their current employers in a phased retirement
arrangement will find switching to a new employer an attractive
option. If their current employer has a defined benefit plan,
employees under age sixty-five who have earned or are close to
earning their maximum benefits under that plan may choose to
work for a new employer part-time while drawing pensions from
their previous employer. If their current employer has a 401(k)
plan, employees over age fifty-five may quit so they can withdraw
funds without a tax penalty as needed from their 401(k) accounts
rather than waiting until age fifty-nine and one-half.
Two issues are raised by the tax treatment of defined
contribution plans. First, should we remove the tax penalties for
withdrawals by current employees before age fifty-nine and onehalf? Doing so would be more neutral with respect to the age of
retirement and would rationalize the tax treatment of current and
former employees.
This change might also facilitate the
development of more flexible partial retirement arrangements
before fifty-nine and one-half. However, the tax subsidy provided
for retirement savings has a clear purpose. It encourages people
to provide for an adequate income for their retirement and
allowing early, penalty-free withdrawals would interfere with that
goal. In that sense, the philosophy of the tax law is consistent
with the philosophy of compelling people to join the Social Security
system. Society feels the need to protect itself against people who
would otherwise irresponsibly spend too much during their
working lives and throw themselves into safety net programs, such
as the Supplemental Security Income program, when they are
elderly.
The second question is, should pension and profit-sharing
plans should be treated the same by the tax law? That is to say,
both might allow penalty-free withdrawals after age fifty-nine and
one-half whether or not the employee continues to work for the
same employer. That would appear to be a desirable reform.
B. Special Protectionsfor Older Workers: The ADEA
Phased retirement programs will inevitably be subject to an
additional overlay of regulation under the Age Discrimination in
House of Representatives on July 13, 2000 but was not enacted into law.
106th Cong., 146 CONG. REc. E. 1229 (2000).
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Employment Act ("ADEA"). From a phased retirement perspective,
the ADEA is particularly problematic. It is a highly specialized
area of labor law within the family of employment discrimination
statutes, and both substantively and procedurally, quite different
from the tax and labor law familiar to benefits professionals. In
addition, it is, however, ambiguous and not well tested when
compared to its counterparts in the Code and ERISA. Its
application to employee benefit plans is just beginning to be
fleshed out by the courts as older employees begin to assert age
discrimination claims against perceived benefit cutbacks.
Nevertheless, the ADEA will play a prominent role in the
development of phased retirement programs because such plans
fall squarely within its mandate of protecting older workers. It is
just difficult at this time to predict the contours of its role. Court
cases, rather than government statutes or regulations, typically
shape the evolution of the ADEA. Because age discrimination
lawsuits on benefits issues are still in their infancy, it will be
many years before there is enough settled case law to measure the
influence of the ADEA on employee benefit plans.

Exhibit 4. Rules Related To Age:
" employers may no longer require employees to retire;
• employers are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of
age in their benefit plans;
" life insurance, health insurance, and disability benefits for
older workers must satisfy an "equal benefit" or "equal cost"
standard;
* a retirement plan may not refuse participation to employees
on the basis of age;
* a retirement plan may not stop benefit accruals or
contributions because of a participant's age;
" a retirement plan may not decrease benefit accruals because
of increasing age;
" a retirement plan must vest participants at the later of age 65
or after 5 years of participation.

The ADEA forbids employers from discriminating against
workers age forty and older with respect to the "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age" or "to limit, segregate, or classify.., employees
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
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status as an employee, because of such individual's age."1 5 It
applies to public and private employers with at least twenty
employees. Under a recent Supreme Court case, however, state
governments are immune from suits by individual employees
under the ADEA. 16 Its primary influence on benefit law to date
has been to eliminate rules related to chronological age that used
to limit older workers' participation in benefit plans. Exhibit 4
illustrates those rules that largely apply to retirement plans. 7
The ADEA does permit a limited number of age distinctions in
employee benefits plans. For example, a retirement plan may set
a minimum age for early or normal retirement benefits, and
defined benefit plans are permitted to pay subsidized earlyretirement benefits as well as Social Security supplements.'8 In
addition, employers have a defense against age discrimination
claims when their actions can be justified by the terms of a bona
fide employee benefit plan. 9 This defense is available, provided
that the plan satisfies an "equal cost or equal benefit" standard in
the benefits paid to older workers. 20 The EEOC, the agency with
regulatory authority over the ADEA, however, has taken the
position that the equal cost defense does not apply to retirement
plans.2
But the full implications of this EEOC ruling are not clear,
and in general, there continues to be a great deal of legal
uncertainty surrounding the ADEA and its application to
employee benefit plans. Section 11 of the ADEA provides that
"[t]he term 'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment' encompasses all employee benefits, including such22
benefits provided pursuant to a bona fide employee benefit plan."
The ADEA does not, however, elaborate on the meaning of "a bona
fide employee benefit plan." It is also silent on when a benefits
plan that satisfies all Code and ERISA requirements may violate
the ADEA's prohibition against age discrimination.
In some
instances, such as the requirement that benefit accruals continue

15. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000) (corresponds to ADEA §4(a) (2002)).
16. Kimel v. Florida Bd.of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 83-84 (2000).
17. Many of the changes made by the ADEA to benefit law are

incorporated into both the Code and ERISA. Because the IRS, rather than the
U.S. Dept. of Labor, typically has jurisdiction over these ADEA-related rules,
they will be discussed as Code rules.
18. 29 U.S.C. §623(l)(1) (2000) (corresponds to ADEA §4(l)(1) (2002)).

19. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2)(B) (2000) (corresponds to ADEA §4(f)(2)(B)
(2002)).
20. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000) (corresponds to ADEA §4(f)(2)(B)(i)
(2002)).
21. EEOC Compliance Manual on Employee Benefits, October 3, 2000,
available at: http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/benefits.html (last visited June 30,
2002) [hereinafter Compliance Manual].
22. ADEA §11(1) (2002); 29 U.S.C. § 630(1) (2002).
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after normal retirement age, the ADEA specifically incorporates
related provisions under ERISA and the Code. But the vast body
of employee benefit law is not incorporated into the ADEA. In
addition, the EEOC takes the position that
[nieither [the tax code nor ERISA] is a defense to conduct that is
unlawful under the ADEA... because neither requires an employer
to discriminate on the basis of age. Thus the fact that a plan meets
the standards of ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code is typically
irrelevant in determining whether the plan is in compliance with
the ADEA.23
Until there is more guidance on the extent to which benefit
plans that satisfy the Code and ERISA must be changed to comply
with the ADEA, employers will be reluctant to adopt phased
retirement plans, largely because of their legal exposure. The first
test of the EEOC's position should come soon in some pending
litigation over the conversion of defined benefit plans to cash
balance plans. Some older employees have argued that they are
discriminated against by the formula used to calculate accrued
benefits after a conversion. The resolution of these cases will be
important not just as a matter of statutory interpretation, but
because the economic stakes are high for both employees and
employers. Older employees stand to lose the value of their most
valuable years of benefit accruals under their defined benefit
pension plans if they lose the case. If employers lose, the potential
damages are very significant. In addition to paying employees the
benefits they should have received as required by ERISA, an
employer may, under ADEA, also be required to pay compensatory
damages for mental anguish and inconvenience, as well as
punitive damages for intentional discrimination, attorneys' fees
and court costs.
C. A Precedent: Early Retirement Programs
One way to illustrate the legal difficulties facing phased
retirement programs is to look at a precedent involving nearly
identical legal issues. During the recession of the early 1990s,
employers wanted to offer early retirement incentives to encourage
workers to leave voluntarily through retirement rather than
involuntarily through layoffs.
These incentives were often
structured as "windows" or short-term programs, and employers
wanted to have the flexibility to decide which employees would be
eligible for the program. The benefits package often included both
enhanced retirement benefits and retiree health benefits.
The legal issues confronting these plans were extremely
complex. Under pension law, how could a plan make a short-term
program available to a select group of employees? On its face, this
23. See Compliance Manual supra note 21, at 8.
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seemed to violate long-standing pension rules promoting uniform
and standard benefits and preventing employer discretion. In
practice,
these programs would
probably violate nondiscrimination rules as well because older, and presumably
higher-paid, employees within the plan population could receive
more generous benefits. Under the ADEA, how could an employer
offer benefits that could be greater for younger workers than older
workers in the targeted group? Many employers also had a
practice of requiring workers accepting special early retirement
offers to waive their rights to sue under various employment
statutes including the ADEA. Was this permissible under the
ADEA or other benefit law? Under pension law, waivers of
benefits have long been subject to special scrutiny. Judges will
generally only enforce waivers that can be shown to be truly
knowing and voluntary.24 Under case law, individual waivers
would be either be upheld or denied, depending on the facts and
circumstances of each lawsuit. As a result, because there were no
uniform legal standards for waivers, employers had no advance
assurance that their waivers would protect them from lawsuits.
In the end, the legal issues were so complex that resolutions
came only through new legislation and regulatory action. The IRS
added language to its non-discrimination regulations setting
standards for special early retirement window benefits. 5
The ADEA was amended to permit certain early retirement
programs and waivers of benefits in those programs.2 ' The
compromise solution for early retirement programs is illustrated
in Exhibit 5. In addition, the ADEA was amended to permit
waivers of rights to sue provided they: 1) are part of a written
agreement specifically listing the claims to be waived; 2) are
effective only as to claims available before the waiver is signed; 3)
include additional consideration for the employee; and 4) advise
the employee to consult with an attorney, give at least forty-five
days to review the offer, and provide specific information about the
program including: eligibility and time limits; the job titles and
ages of employees who are covered by the program; and the ages of
similarly-situated employees who are ineligible. The compromise
24. See, e.g., Finz v. Schlesinger, 957 F.2d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that a judge must review a waiver of ERISA rights in the context of: 1) the

plaintiffs educational background and business experience; 2) the amount of
time the plaintiff had to review the agreement before signing it; 3) the
plaintiffs role in formulating the agreement's terms; 4) the clarity of the
agreement; 5) whether the employer encouraged the plaintiff to seek legal
advice or whether the plaintiff was represented by or consulted with an
attorney; and 6) whether the consideration given was beyond those employee
benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or law).
25. I.R.C § 1.401(a)(4)-4(d)(3) (2002).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (2000) (corresponds to ADEA §
623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (2002)).
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resolution of the legal issues surrounding early retirement
programs is neither elegant nor simple. It has not eliminated
litigation, because there are sometimes allegations of age
discrimination, but the law has generally worked in that early
retirement incentive programs are now commonplace, and
accepted by employers, employees, and the courts.

Exhibit 5. The Compromise Solution for Early Retirement Plans:
* an early retirement plan must be voluntary;
" an employer may set a minimum age, or years of service for
eligibility;
" the plan may be offered for a limited period of time;
* the plan may be offered to selected groups of employees;
" the plan may not provide lower level benefits to older
employees unless it meets the equal cost or benefits test,
provides the subsidized portion of an early retirement
benefit, or is a Social Security supplement plan.

D. PhasedRetirement: The Employer's Perspective
Although phased retirement has become a popular topic, little
data are available on the extent of these programs today. Because
they are not subject to government reporting requirements, there
is no systematic information about how many employers are
In addition, little information is
adopting these programs.
available about how employers are structuring the work
arrangements, deciding which employees are eligible, or creating
pay policies in phased retirement plans. In the last two years,
however, some exploratory studies have been conducted which
provide preliminary data. The benefits consulting firm of Watson
Wyatt Worldwide recently surveyed about 500 of its employerclients on their phased retirement programs," and the benefits
consulting firm of William M. Mercer questioned over 200 of its
clients.28 In addition, AARP funded a number of small studies on
phased retirement including a combination of interviews and case

27. Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Phased Retirement: A Work in Progress,
2000 , available at: http://www.watsonwyatt.com/search/publications.asp?
(last visited
Component=Insider&ArticleID=7610&nm=Watson%20Wyatt
June 8, 2002); Watson Wyatt Worldwide Phased Retirement - Reshaping the
at:
2000,
available
Case,
Business
The
of
Work:
End

http://www.watsonwyatt.com/search/publications.asp?Component=Insider&Ar
ticlelD=8376&nm=Watson%20Wyatt (last visited June 8, 2002) [hereinafter
Watson Wyatt].
28. William M. Mercer, Phased Retirement and the Changing Face of
Retirement, May 2001.
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Taken together, the three

1. Employers express interest in phased retirement, but only a
small minority currently try to implement it.
Only sixteen percent of employers in the Watson Wyatt
study"0 and twenty-three percent in the Mercer study3" offered
work options, programs, or plans to ease the transition to
retirement.
Among the sixty-five companies interviewed by
AARP, about thirty percent offered part-time work or flexible
schedules. 2 The studies do not reveal the typical number of hours
worked nor do they describe common types of flexible
arrangements offered by companies. The findings are consistent
with the data from the HRS indicating that only eighteen percent
of older workers are employed by firms that allow reduced hours. 3
2.

There is no uniform model for current employees.

Employers employ a variety of strategies and techniques. A
common practice is to arrange part-time work for individual
employees; however, a rarer practice involves formal structured
programs for groups of employees.
3. Rehiring retireesfor part-time and temporary work is the most
common arrangement.
In addition to (or sometimes instead of) making phased
retirement available to their current employees, many employers
have a practice of rehiring retirees for less than full-time work
from either their firm or another company. The Watson Wyatt
study, for example, reported that seventy-five percent of employers
with phased retirement arrangements hired retirees as part-time
and temporary workers.' Among sixty-five companies interviewed
by AARP, over sixty percent hired back retirees." In the Mercer
study, sixty-three percent of the surveyed employers reported have
a policy of hiring retirees, 6 although it is not clear whether these
were their own retirees or retirees from another company. Hiring
former employees can present some difficult legal issues, discussed
later in this article, for phased retirement programs.

29. AARP, Easing the Transition: Phased and Partial Retirement
Programs:Highlights; 1999.
30. Watson Wyatt, supra note 27.
31. Mercer, supra note 28.
32. AARP, supra note 29.

33.
34.
35.
36.

Penner, Perun & Steuerle, supra note 10.
Watson Wyatt, supra note 27.
AARP, supra note 29.
Mercer, supra note 28.
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4. Privateemployers lag far behind public and not-for-profit
employers in sponsoringphased retirementprograms.
The Watson Wyatt study reports that employers in education,
public administration, and health care offer phased retirement
programs most frequently. 7
E. Why CreatingProgramsfor CurrentEmployees is Difficult.
The apparent reluctance of employers to craft programs to
ease the transition to retirement for current employees has many
possible explanations. In the Mercer study, a large percentage of
employers who reported not having a program felt that phased
retirement was not a priority for them (65%) or their employees
(11%)."8 Only four percent cited legal complexity as a deterrent.39
But the numbers alone do not give a true picture. The majority of
these same employers actually do offer phased retirement
opportunities-just not through a plan. Their preference is to
make individual retirement arrangements for selected employees,
only on an ad hoc basis.
From the employer's perspective, this strategy makes a great
deal of sense. It achieves the goal expressed by many employers
(49% of employers in the Watson Wyatt survey and 30% in the
Mercer survey41) to retain employees with specialized skills and
expertise. It provides an employer with an opportunity to be
creative when deciding how the work arrangement should be
structured, which employees should be eligible, and how
employees will be paid. It is a perfectly legal way to avoid the
hassles of a more structured program-but only up to a point. The
ADEA, Code, and ERISA only regulate employee benefit "plans,"
so once an employer arrangement qualifies as a plan it must
satisfy all the relevant rules.
Consequently, individual arrangements are a stop-gap
measure at best.
If an employer limits phased retirement
opportunities to only a select few employees, they will work well.
Even if the employer chooses only highly-paid executives,
individual arrangements are permissible.42 But if the number of
employees grows and the employment arrangements are
sufficiently similar, a series of individual arrangements will, at
some point, become a "plan." Unfortunately, at the present time,
there are no clear legal rules on when a series of informal
37. Watson Wyatt, supra note 27.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Watson Wyatt, supra note 27.
41. Mercer, supra note 28.

42. ERISA provides exemptions from its usual requirements for so-called
"top hat" plans that are designed for a select group of management and highlypaid employees.
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arrangements becomes a "plan."48 Most employers will not even be
aware of their potential exposure until sued by some disgruntled
employee. But at that point they may encounter the full weight of
liability under the Code, ERISA, and the ADEA.
When individual arrangements are no longer practical, what
is the next best strategy for an employer? The survey data
indicate that many employers take the first step toward a formal
phased retirement program by offering reduced hours or work
schedules to current employees. This type of arrangement is
unlikely to be termed a plan under either ERISA or the Code
because neither law regulates the work hours of employees. This
is a typical practice adopted by about sixty percent of the
employers; in the Watson Wyatt study," fifty percent of the
employers in the Mercer study,45 and thirty percent of the
employers interviewed in the AARP study.46 If this arrangement is
made available to a broad-based group identified-for example, by
length of service or job level-it should be reasonably free of ADEA
issues. If employees merely shift to part-time work with wages
and benefits correspondingly reduced, there are few legal
difficulties. But merely offering part-time work would rarely be
satisfactory for most employers or employees.
It provides
employers nothing extra to offer the employees that they wish
most to retain, and it gives employees nothing more than what
they could probably negotiate on their own. This also costs
employees some of the welfare and pension benefits they might
otherwise receive.
As a practical matter, the only feasible strategy for employers
who would like to retain large numbers of employees through
phased retirement is to create a broad-based formal program.
Having a formal plan offers advantages to an employer. From a
legal perspective, it greatly minimizes exposure to liability under
state law and ADEA claims.47 From a design perspective, however,
creating a formal program can be a nightmare. As was true of
43. Although ERISA provides definitions for types of welfare and pension
plans, it is often left to the courts to determine when a particular arrangement
has become a plan. Courts generally consider the following factors: 1) whether

there is an administrative scheme requiring employer discretion; and 2)
whether there is a continuing commitment to provide benefits. See, e.g., Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 US 1, 6-7 (1986) (holding that a state

severance pay statute is not pre-empted by ERISA, since it does not involve an
administrative scheme requiring employer discretion as would be necessary to
qualify it as an "employee benefit plan" under that statute's pre-emption
provision).

44. Watson Wyatt, supra note 27.
45. Mercer, supra note 28.
46. AARP, supra note 29.

47. If the plan is an ERISA plan, it is protected from state law claims
through a preemption provision. In addition, an employer can assert a bonafide-benefit-plan defense to claims under the ADEA.
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early retirement programs before the law was restructured,
employers do not have the ability under current law to create
flexible, targeted phased retirement programs. Early retirement
programs are much simpler from a legal perspective because they
are only concerned with exiting employees. Phased retirement
programs pose many more complicated issues because they are
concerned with employees who are simultaneously continuing and
exiting from work. Example 1 illustrates many of the legal
obstacles facing an employer trying to tailor a plan to this segment
of its workforce.

Example 1. Employer A wants a phased retirement program for
current employees. Can it...
• create special increased benefits in its retirement plans just
for phased retirees?
Extremely unlikely, unless rigorous non-discrimination tax
rules could be satisfied.
" limit the program just to employees in certain job categories
or with designated service?
Probably, but if only high-paid employees qualify, its
retirement plans may fail tax law coverage and nondiscrimination requirements.
" require phased retirees to retire fully after 5 years?
Probably not, the ADEA prohibits a mandatory retirement.
" make distributions from a defined benefit plan to supplement
pay?
Yes, but only at the individual's option, and if he or she has
reached the normal retirement age (usually age 65) in the
plan.
" make distributions from a defined contribution plan to
supplement pay?
It depends. No, if the plan is a money purchase plan and
the individual hasn't reached its normal retirement age Yes, at the individual's option and if the profit-sharing plan
has the usual distribution options for employer
contributions - No. if the plan is a 401(k) and the individual
wants to withdraw his or her own contributions before
reaching age 59 but loans and hardship distributions may
be available.
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* stop accruing benefits or making contributions under its
retirement plans for phased retirees?
Generally not, but there is an exception for individuals who
have reached a service limit under a defined benefit plan
formula.
" require phased retirees to waive participation in retirement
plans?
No.
" permit phased retirees to choose between retirement plan
participation and a higher rate of current pay?
No, this is arguably a 401(k) plan in an impermissible form.
* promise to pay phased retirees more after full retirement but
not through its retirement plans?
No, this would be a pension plan subject to, but also
guaranteed to flunk, ERISA's funding, coverage and
participation rules and tax code non-discrimination rules.
" promise to pay phased retirees more now?
Yes.

As Example 1 indicates, a formal phased retirement program
provides employers with little flexibility. To satisfy a combination
of ADEA and tax law concerns, its eligibility criteria must be
broad-based. To satisfy ERISA and tax law concerns, retirement
benefits must also be broad-based and include those employees in
phased retirement programs.
Employers would often like to
provide financial incentives to retain employees, who might
otherwise retire, draw full retirement benefits, and then go to
work part-time for a competitor. To be attractive, a program must
offer more than part-time pay. But the most convenient sources of
supplemental income, the employer's retirement plans, cannot be
modified to provide a special supplement to retirement income or
make other special benefits available to phased retirees. An
employee may prefer additional immediate compensation to higher
retirement benefits later, but an employer is not allowed to offer
such a deal. Most employers must continue to fund additional
benefits in their retirement plans for phased retirees.48 While
additional cash compensation is legal, this would make an
employee very expensive when the additional cash is combined
with a mandatory addition to retirement benefits.

48. I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(H) (2002).
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The problems posed by retirement plans for phased
retirement arrangements are not entirely due to current laws that
promote uniformity and standardization of participation and
benefits, although they do play a significant role. Neither are the
tax rules that control the timing of distributions that much to
blame. These rules all create disincentives for employers to
sponsor and employees to participate in phased retirement
programs, but they do not absolutely prevent it.
More
fundamental and intractable disincentives can be found in the
structure of retirement plans themselves, with defined benefit
plans being the primary culprits.
Employers have long found defined benefit plans useful as a
tool to promote retirement at a predictable age, usually no later
than age sixty-five and often much earlier. Defined benefit plans
are not age-neutral. Participants typically accrue benefits under a
formula that maximizes benefits around normal retirement age for
a full-career employee. The Code does impose certain accrual
standards known as "anti-backloading" rules to make sure
participants accrue a reasonable portion of their benefits earlier in
their careers. But, as a practical matter, employees often receive
their most valuable benefit accruals earlier than the normal
retirement age. Previous studies demonstrated that once past the
age at which benefits accrue most rapidly in typical privatedefined benefit plans, further accruals provide little, if any,
incentive to work longer.4 9
Moreover, the majority of plans contain early retirement
options that provide a substantial incentive for retirement before
normal retirement age. These permit employees to retire at an
earlier-than-normal retirement age, usually age fifty-five to sixtytwo, after completing fewer-generally between fifteen and twenty
years of service-than the number of years required for a full
retirement benefit.
Early retirement benefits are attractive
because they are frequently subsidized by the use of favorable
actuarial calculations.
Defined benefit plans have these characteristics because for
decades employers found them useful devices for rationalizing the
retirement process for their workforces. Now that later retirement
is an issue, they have a perverse effect because their accrual
structure cannot be easily adapted to encourage later retirement.
Employers are generally not free to amend their plans to remove
or cutback on early retirement subsidies because these are
protected benefits under the Code's non-discrimination rules.
It is also difficult for them to terminate their defined benefit
plans and replace them with other plans. Defined benefit plans
are expensive to terminate because tax law imposes a fifty percent

49. Penner, Perun & Steuerle, supra note 10.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[35:633

excise tax on excess assets returned to the employer after all
benefits have been paid.
Converting them into defined
contribution plans is not an option either because this just results
in de facto plan termination.
The only feasible option for
employers is to convert their plans into "cash balance" plans that
are defined benefit plans with defined contribution features.
Participants accrue benefits under these plans through a more
age-neutral, front-loaded formula, and few provide early
retirement subsidies. But even this option is not easy.
Not all employers will want to make the substantial changes
a conversion requires, such as developing a new plan formula and
funding schedule, re-drafting the plan document, informing
participants, and obtaining the IRS's approval. In addition, cash
balance plans have achieved certain notoriety among employees.
Older employees, for example, find that the benefits they accrue
under the cash balance design are far less than they would have
accrued under the defined benefit plan.
In addition, many
employers add a "wear away" feature to their plans as part of a
conversion. This usually means that older employees actually
receive reduced or no contributions to their cash balance accounts
for several years until the value of any early retirement subsidies
accrued under the defined benefit plan has been eroded.
Employees have argued that such features constitute age
discrimination, and these issues are currently in litigation. Many
employers have responded to the controversy over cash balance
conversions by adding some additional protections for older
workers.
Some let employees choose between the new cash
balance formula and the old defined benefit formula. Others
grandfather more of the benefit previously subsidized in the
defined benefit plan.
If this trend continues, cash balance
conversions will become even more common among employers and
more acceptable to employees.
Defined contribution plans, because they are legitimately ageneutral and more front-loaded, do not provide incentives for early
retirement that are as powerful as those provided by defined
benefit plans. Participants receive contributions based on their
annual compensation as long as they continue to work. In some
circumstances, defined contribution plans can even contain
incentives for continued work. Depending on the demographics of
an employer's workforce, defined contribution plans can have an
age-weighted allocation formula so that older workers receive
higher employer contributions than younger workers. Over the
past ten years, defined contribution plans have become the
dominant form of retirement plan. Employers who offer only
defined contribution plans-and this is now the majority of
employers among those with retirement plans-find phased
retirement programs easier to implement, even under the
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limitations of current law.
F. Why Hiring Retirees is Preferred
Many employers have found (or believe they have found) a
satisfactory alternative to the difficulties presented by formal
programs for current employees. They hire retirees-their own
and retirees of other companies. Some sixty percent of employers
in the Mercer study,"0 as well as those interviewed in the AARP
study,"1 reported a policy of rehiring retirees.
There are a number of popular arrangements. Many hire
retirees for part-time and temporary work. For example, seventyfive percent of employers in the Watson Wyatt study52 and sixtythree percent of employers in the Mercer study53 who rehire
retirees offer this option, and an additional 15% of employers
maintain a pool of retirees for temporary work. Some 24% of
employers in the Mercer study' will even rehire retirees full-time.
Hiring retirees as consultants - without benefits - is also common.
Over 60% of the employers who hire retirees in the Mercer study5
and over 40% of the employers in the Watson Wyatt study56 will
use consulting arrangements.
On its face, hiring retirees seems an obvious solution to the
problems associated with current retirees. It gives employers an
opportunity to attract workers with specialized skills and
expertise, usually on a flexible, as needed basis. It also appears to
provide employers with the ability to negotiate employment
arrangements that provide flexibility in determining compensation
and benefits costs. All in all, a win-win situation-but generally
only if the retirees are from some other company. For many
employers, hiring former employees is hardly trouble-free. The
type of arrangement-whether the retiree is hired as an employee
or a consultant-largely determines the scope of the difficulties.
When their former company hires retirees as employees, the
problematic issue is the employer's benefit plans. Again, defined
benefit plans are the primary culprits. Defined benefit plans may
not pay benefits before termination of employment or attainment
of normal retirement age. Many employers adopt a popular
strategy to satisfy this rule-the "retire/rehire" scenario. In this
case, employees who would like to begin receiving retirement
benefits while continuing to work resign or retire but are soon
rehired-sometimes the next day-by their former employer. The
50. Mercer, supra note 28.

51. AARP, supra note 29.
52. Watson Wyatt, supra note 27.

53. Mercer, supra note 28.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Watson Wyatt, supra note 27.
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law is very clear that employees must truly terminate employment
to be entitled to retirement benefits from pension plans before
normal retirement age. But the law is unclear about what
57
constitutes a termination of employment that satisfies the rule.
So many employers take advantage of the absence of clear
guidelines and bestow retiree status liberally. There is little risk
of detection and even less risk of enforcement. Few employees
would sue because the arrangement only benefits them, and
federal regulators would only become aware of the issue-if even
then-through a detailed plan audit. On the other hand, the
penalty for being caught-possible plan disqualification and loss of
tax benefits for all plan participants-is severe. Many employers
are more cautious and require a waiting period before former
employees are rehired. In the Mercer study, employers who rehire
their own retirees reported requiring a mean waiting period of 5.2
months.58 Although this is a judgment call, most pension experts
would agree that this waiting period would probably satisfy the
rule, provided that it was not part of a clearly prearranged
agreement.
The retire/rehire problem, of course, only applies to an
employer's former employees. All retirees hired as employees,
however, may pose problems for an employer's benefit plans.
Many employers would like to restrict participation by retirees.
This is relatively easy to do in welfare plans if employers are
careful either to define the category of eligible employees to
exclude retirees, where possible, or to keep their hours worked
below the minimum required, generally twenty hours a week, for
participation. A thousand-hour a year threshold for participation
applies in most retirement plans but is generally effective only
with respect to "new" retiree employees.
Although employers are allowed to exclude employees in the
above categories from retirement plans and other benefits, most
former employees are eligible to resume participation in their
employer's plans immediately upon rehire." Including retirees

57. There is little IRS guidance on this point. Its most complete
explanation can be found in a relatively obscure document, General Counsel
Memorandum, 38924 (July 26, 1990). This document discusses the legal
difference between the terms "severance from employment" for purposes of
making pension distributions, and "separation from the service", a term used

to define a lump sum for purposes of obtaining favorable tax treatment for a
distribution.
58. Mercer, supra note 28.

59. Although an employer may exclude certain categories of employees
from retirement plans, the IRS looks with disfavor on any excluded category
called "part-time employee" or "temporary employee." It takes the position
that these definitions could violate ERISA's minimum service standards for
participation. As a result, most employers are not able to exclude retirees
from their retirement plans by defining them as part-time. Retirees can be
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who work part-time in plans is not only an expense for employers,
it is often an administrative burden if the retirees work only
sporadically or infrequently. Employers usually still must track
the hours of service performed by these retirees to determine
whether they are eligible for an additional benefit accrual or a
contribution each year.
Many employers prefer to avoid the benefits eligibility issue
for retirees entirely by hiring them through consulting contracts.
A consultant is an independent contractor, not an employee, and is
therefore ineligible for employee benefits programs. This solution
works well from a legal perspective provided that the retiree
actually is an independent contractor. The difference between an
independent contractor and an employee from a legal perspective
is a judgment call. However, a very important test under IRS
regulations is whether the individual sets the conditions-how,
when, and where-of his or her work.6° There are no statistics on
this point, but it is very likely that many retirees, called
independent contractors, cannot satisfy this standard.
They
typically perform the same job as consultants that they performed
as employees, looking and acting more like employees than not.
Until recently, misclassification of employees-designating
employees as independent contractors to avoid paying benefitswas not a major legal issue. Now it is a hot topic because
individuals who were classified as independent contractors have
brought several high-profile class action lawsuits seeking
retroactive employee status to obtain benefits. The IRS and the
Department of Labor have initiated enforcement actions against
several large employers to obtain benefits wrongly denied and
FICA taxes owed to employees misclassified as independent
contractors. 6 ' Hiring retirees as consultants is still an appropriate
strategy for the careful employer, but the penalty of worker
misclassification-from past FICA payments to retroactive plan
benefits-is high and more certain than in the past.
G. Why Public Employers Have an Advantage
Since the early 1980s, public sector employers, such as public
colleges, universities, and offices of state government, have been
developing phased retirement programs with innovative benefits
features. These employers have long been aware of the problems
posed by an aging workforce because their employees tended to be
excluded only if they fall into some bona fide employee classification excluded
from the plan, or fail to satisfy a length of service requirement.
60. See Rev. Rul. 1987-1 CB 296 (describing the IRS issuance of a list of
twenty factors that are used to determine whether an individual is an
employee or independent contractor).
61. Viczaino v. Microsoft, 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) is the
leading case in this area.
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long service employees. State and local governments provide a
wide range of benefits to their employees on a uniform basis.
Many of those benefits-such as healthcare-continue for retirees.
So state and local governments already have in place many of the
components of a phased retirement program that private
employers typically do not. But state and local governments
shared one disadvantage with the private sector - the disincentives
to continued employment contained in their defined benefit plans.
Taking advantage of their exemption as public employers from
ERISA, and many of the more complicated tax rules governing
benefit plans, they developed a plan, typically called a "Deferred
Retirement Option Plan" ("DROP"), that adds pension incentives
to their phased retirement programs.

Example 2. A Typical DROP
Employees enter a phased retirement program. They set a future
retirement date. While they continue to work part-time:
benefit accruals cease under the defined benefit plan;
benefit payments begin but are held in separate defined
contribution account in the plan;
these amounts earn interest and often a cost-of-living
adjustment.
At full retirement, employees receive:
the balance in their accounts in a lump sum, as well as
annuity payments, usually for life, from the defined benefit
plan.

A DROP is a defined benefit plan that has a special defined
contribution feature for employees who work past normal
retirement age. Example 2 describes the characteristic features of
a DROP. Usually, employees cease accruing benefits under the
defined benefit plan on a specified date when their benefit is
frozen. While they continue to work, the pension they would
otherwise have received (if they had retired) is credited to a special
account in the plan and earns interest either at an amount stated
in the plan or based on the interest earned by the plan as a whole.
Many DROPs require an employer contribution to the account as
well.
In some DROPs, mandatory employee contributions, if
required, are also made to the DROP account.
When the
employees actually retire, they begin receiving annuity payments
calculated on the basis of their frozen benefit under the defined
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benefit plan. They are also entitled to receive their DROP account
payable in a lump sum, installments, used to purchase a larger
annuity.
A DROP offers the following advantages to employees. It
provides them an opportunity to earn additional pension credits in
the form of interest after they may have maxed-out under the
standard defined benefit plan formula. Even if they have not
maxed out, the interest credited to their DROP account may be
greater than the amount of any additional accrual they would
have otherwise received. It also provides employees with a large
lump sum payment-rarely available under a standard defined
benefit plan-upon actual retirement. At the same time, they
continue to be guaranteed their lifetime monthly income from the
defined benefit plan. One drawback of a DROP is that it does not
provide any pension income while the employee continues to work.
So this type of phased retirement program is only likely to appeal
to employees who can afford to work part-time because they have
other resources.
The advantages to employers are both financial and
administrative. DROPs provide employers with more control over
increases in benefit accruals and therefore the financial
requirements of their plans. Depending on the particular plan,
however, cost savings are not guaranteed and plan expenses may
in fact increase. Many DROPs also require employees to agree to
retire within a stated number of years, usually five, as a condition
of entry. So employers also have more information about their
future personnel needs while retaining the services of experienced
employees for a transitional period. This does not necessarily
mean that employers have some discretion over participation in
the DROP. Unlike their private sector counterparts, most public
sector plans cover large groups of employees with few exclusions.
Participation in a DROP is typically available to all employees who
meet uniform eligibility standards so employers are not
guaranteed to retain only the employees they prefer.
The legality of DROPs is not entirely free from doubt.
Individual plans may raise questions over whether the DROP
accounts satisfy contribution limits or other defined contribution
plan rules or whether the DROP accounts comply with the
requirement that defined benefit plans provide definitely
There are also some concerns about
determinable benefits.
whether the required retirement provision violates rules against
mandatory retirement, despite the voluntary nature of DROPs.
But DROPs have functioned successfully throughout the public
sector for some twenty years, and they are unlikely to be subject to
serious legal challenge at this point.
Tax law and ERISA have a number of provisions that prevent
private sector employers from creating DROPs. For example,
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DROPs are usually unable to satisfy rules on coverage and
discrimination because they are not usually made available to a
broad group of employees. In addition, the IRS's interpretations of
current law make DROPs financially unattractive to some
employers. Internal Revenue Code § 414(k) permits a defined
benefit plan to contain separate accounts that are treated as a
defined contribution plan.62 But while the law provides this
mechanism for implementing DROPs, recent IRS interpretations
have made it difficult for private sector employees to do so. The
IRS has taken the position that excess assets in defined benefit
plans may not be used to fund 414(k) accounts without being
treated as a reversion of plan assets to the employer.6" This means
that an employer would have to fund these accounts with new
contributions or pay income tax and a 50% excise tax on plan
assets used for that purpose. As a practical matter, DROPs are
not currently available to private sector employers as a component
of a phased retirement program.
H. PhasedRetirement: The Employee's Perspective
Employees are attracted to phased retirement programs for
several reasons. For many older workers, longer employment is a
necessity because they are not financially prepared for retirement.
For others, the financial rewards of work are less important than
the personal satisfaction that work can bring. Some value the
social interactions of work and the importance of opportunities to
maintain relationships with friends and colleagues. Still others
enjoy exercising the expertise and skills that they have developed
over their work lives. For these workers, leaving the workforce
entirely is neither desirable nor practical. Phased retirement
programs can therefore fulfill a variety of needs-both economic
and psychological-for these workers while adding flexibility and a
better balance between work and family to their lives.
Even if not motivated by monetary considerations, employees
who enter a phased retirement arrangement need to pay close
attention to its economics. These arrangements have financial as
well as lifestyle implications. Benefit laws, and therefore benefit
plans, are full of legal quirks and pitfalls for the unwary employee.
In addition, phased retirement programs have no formal
disclosure requirements. For many workers, a phased retirement
program may neither be a good idea, nor a beneficial deal.
I. ProtectingPension Expectations
For most employees, the most important consideration is
whether a phased retirement arrangement will adversely affect
62. I.R.C. § 401(k) (2002).
63. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9723033 (Mar. 10, 1997).
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the retirement benefits that they will eventually receive. In many
respects, the law has built-in protections for older workers. Older
workers continue to participate in their employer's retirement
plan and receive additional accruals or contributions. Rehired
former employees are generally immediately re-admitted to those
plans. But employees, particularly those in defined benefit plans,
should be aware of the following issues.
First, employees who participate in "final average pay"
defined benefit plans should not switch to part-time work before
reaching normal retirement age. These plans use a formula that
largely bases benefits on the average salary earned in the years
closest to retirement. Employees who switch to part-time work as
they near retirement age lose valuable benefits because their
ultimate retirement benefits are calculated on a much lower
The IRS has recently indicated that such
average salary.
reductions may be questionable." But without a firm IRS position
on this point, employers will not change this common practice.
Second, many employees rely on benefits from a defined
benefit plan to supplement income from part-time work. But
many plans, at the employer's option, stop benefit payments to
employees who continue to work past normal retirement age or are
rehired after payments have begun." In the Mercer study, 51% of
employers with defined benefit plans reported stopping benefit
payments to employees working after normal retirement age while
nineteen percent did not.66 It is not clear from the study whether
employers are formally "suspending" benefits or merely postponing
payments until actual retirement, with adjustments for delayed
payment. These issues are extremely technical, and it is difficult
to estimate their importance to most phased retirees. It is likely
that they will be significant only for those employees whose

64. In 2000, Richard Wickersham, a senior IRS representative, stated to

an American Bar Association subcommittee meeting that the IRS took the
position that a final average pay plan may not reduce the already accrued

benefit of an employee whose compensation decreases because this would
violate the rule against an accrued benefit's decreasing on account of
continued service. Under this position, a phased retiree in a final average pay
plan shifting to part-time work would not be at risk for losing already accrued

pension benefits. But this position is not well-publicized or enforced, and, as a
practical matter, many employees in this situation do receive reduced benefits.
For an excellent discussion of this issue, as well as suggested alternatives, see
Patricia L. Scahill & Jonathan Barry Forman, Protecting Participantsand
Beneficiaries in a Phased Retirement World, a paper presented at the SOC'y
ACTUARIES CONF. ON DEMOGRAPHIC & FAM. CHANGE, June 25-26, 2002, San
Francisco, California, available at: http://www.soa.org/library/monographs/

retirement-systems/m-rs02-2/m-rsO2-2_tableofcontents.html
30, 2002).

(last visited July

65. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B) (2000)(corresponding to ERISA § 203(a)(3)(B)

(2002)).
66. Mercer, supra note 28.
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motivation to enter into a phased retirement arrangement is
primarily financial. These are the individuals, of course, who most
need to protect and enhance their future pension expectations as
they continue to work. But these laws are so complicated-as are
the plans themselves-that it is unlikely that participants will be
able to appreciate the difficulty of the choices before them without
individual counseling.
J. The Drawbacks of Part-Time Work
For older workers, pension benefits are perhaps their most
valuable employee benefit.
Other benefits such as health
insurance are also important and, in some cases, critical. Older
workers not yet eligible for Medicare cannot obtain or afford
medical insurance on an individual basis. Although some may
have coverage through a spouse's health plan or from a former
employer through either COBRA or a retiree health plan, an
employer-sponsored plan will be vital for many.
Employees in phased retirement programs typically receive
fewer fringe benefits than full-time employees as illustrated in
Example 3. In the Mercer study, thirty-five percent of responding
employers reported offering no health benefits to older workers on
part-time work schedules, thirty-five percent offered the same
benefits at the same cost, twenty percent offered the same benefits
but at a higher cost, and ten percent offered different benefits.67 In
the Watson Wyatt study, nearly one hundred percent of employers
provided health care, life insurance, and paid vacation benefits to
their full-time employees, but only eighty percent, seventy-one
percent and forty-seven percent, respectively, did so to their
phased retirees.68
Nearly all employers provided disability
coverage for full-time employees but less than forty percent did so
for phased retirees. Many employers who do provide benefits
reduce them for phased retirees. Watson Wyatt reported that
sixty-six percent provided reduced life insurance, forty percent
reduced paid vacation, thirty-two percent reduced disability, and
twenty-nine percent reduced health care benefits. 9

67. Id.
68. Watson Wyatt, supra note 27.

69. Id.
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Example 3. Other Benefits Issues of Phased Retirees
Compared to other employees, phased retirees may receive:
* no health insurance, more costly health insurance, or
different health insurance
" less or no life insurance benefits:
" less or no disability insurance benefits:
• less paid vacation time.

It is not clear from these studies whether these employers
created formal benefits policies for phased retirees or merely
treated them as they do other part-time employees. It is well
known that part-time employees fare poorly from a benefits
perspective. Pension law has the strongest protection for parttime benefits, requiring employers in most cases to cover
employees who work at least 1,000 hours a year. But employers
are generally free to set any eligibility criteria they like for other
fringe benefits.
Those criteria often set at least a half-time
standard for participation and exclude various categories of
employees such as part-time or temporary workers. Neither the
Code nor ERISA set explicit coverage or non-discrimination
standards for most welfare benefits. The ADEA does provide that
employers must provide fringe benefits without regard to an
employee's age and establishes an "equal cost or equal benefit"
standard for health, life, and disability insurance.
But that
standard only applies with respect to the benefits provided older
versus younger workers. It does not set a standard for part-time
versus full-time employees. °
II. AN ACADEMIC MODEL OF PHASED RETIREMENT
Higher education institutions have been leaders in developing
phased retirement programs. These are special purpose programs
designed for faculty members who have life-tenure. When the
ADEA eliminated mandatory retirement in 1987, it temporarily
provided an exemption for tenured faculty members at academic

70. From a pension perspective, employees who work part-time every
week are treated the same as those who work full-time many weeks, but take

extra vacation time. The general standard is that employers must count, for
pension purposes, individuals who work at least 1,000 hours a year.

employee's work pattern while earning those hours is usually not relevant.

An
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institutions.
Prohibitions against mandatory retirement for
faculty did not become effective until 1994; until that time,
mandatory retirement at age seventy continued to be permissible.
When that exemption expired, the academic community became
concerned that many faculty would wish to continue working past
age seventy. If this occurred, it would hamper their ability to hire
new faculty and increase their personnel costs. At the same time,
many institutions were concerned about the loss of large numbers
of faculty that would soon be reaching retirement age. The higher
education community became interested in formulating a more
orderly transition to retirement for its faculty. At the same time,
it felt constrained by legal uncertainties about the scope of the
ADEA (and its early retirement exception) and therefore was
unwilling to create programs without some protection against age
discrimination claims.
The result was the Higher Education Amendments of 1998 to
the ADEA, which created a safe harbor for age-based faculty
retirement incentive programs. 1
The safe harbor permits
additional voluntary benefits to be paid, even though based on age,
as a retirement incentive, provided that 1) the employer is an
institution of higher education; 2) only employees with unlimited
tenure are eligible; 3) the benefits are payable upon voluntary
retirement; 4) no other age-based reductions or elimination of
benefits occurs; 5) the supplemental benefits are in addition to preexisting retirement or severance benefits; and 6) eligible faculty
have 180 days to elect to participate.
A recent study by the American Association of University
Professors of some 1,400 public and private colleges and
universities indicates that the ADEA safe harbor has been
extended to phased retirement programs which enable a faculty
member to transition into retirement over a number of years
rather than all at once. 2 These help faculty transition into
retirement through part-time work as well as by continuing parttime work after formal retirement. About a quarter of the private
institutions in the study reported having phased retirement
programs, representing 50% of doctoral degree granting, 33% of
master degree and 31% of baccalaureate degree private
institutions.73 Parallel figures for public institutions are 31%, 23%,

71. This exemption is found in ADEA § 4(m) (2002). See also David L.
Raish, Age-Based Retirement Incentives for Tenured Faculty Members:
Satisfying the Legal Requirements, in To RETIRE OR NOT? RETIREMENT
POLICY AND PRACTICE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, ch. 3 (2001). (offering a fuller

explanation of the exemption).
72. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Michael J. Rizzo, Faculty Retirement Policies
after the End of Mandatory Retirement, (TIAA-CREF Institute, Research

Dialogue #69, Oct. 2001).
73. Id.
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and 24%, respectively. 4
Faculty phased retirement programs have a number of
innovative features as described in Example 4. Unlike their
counterparts among both private and public employers, they
provide enhanced benefits for phased retirement, rather than just
a pro-rata portion of a standard benefits package or the reduced
benefits offered to all part-time employees. In other respects,
these programs are similar to those available elsewhere. Some
seventy-five percent establish a minimum age for eligibility with
age fifty-five being most common, and some twenty-five percent
also establish a maximum age, usually between sixty-five and
seventy. Another seventy-five percent require minimum years of
service-between ten and twenty years-for eligibility. Many
plans require participants to agree to relinquish tenure and agree
to retire fully at specified dates. Some 16% of programs permit
faculty to work part-time and retain tenure as long as they wish.
But most limit the amount of time tenured faculty can participate
in their phased retirement program with three to five years being
a common period.

Example 4. Phased Retirement Programs for Faculty
The faculty member works part-time but may receive:
" defined contribution plan contributions based on a full-time
salary
" a full year's accrual under a defined benefit plan
" enhanced pay (60% pay for 50% work)
" full employer contributions for health plan premiums.

Institutions with defined contribution plans are twice as
likely to offer phased retirement programs as institutions with
defined benefit plans. In part, this reflects the difficulties that
even these institutions have with providing incentives for
continued work through defined benefit plans. But it probably
also reflects the fact that many private institutions of higher
education offer only defined contribution plans. The Code permits
these institutions to offer a special type of defined contribution
plan that is not subject to the same complicated coverage,
participation and non-discrimination rules as corporate plans."5 As
a result, academic employers have much more flexibility to tailor

74. Id.
75. I.R.C. § 403(b) (2002).
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the benefits in these plans to select groups of employees, even
those that are highly-compensated, and apparently many have
done so successfully.
Academic phased retirement programs are therefore quite
different from those available in the corporate world.
For
example, they are the only phased retirement model explicitly
authorized by law, even though they are just, legally speaking, a
special case of "early" retirement programs. In exchange for this
legal certainty, academic employers are required to provide
enhanced benefits to phased retirees. No specific benefits are
mandated; employers have the freedom to design their own
programs. Employees are required to receive full disclosure about
the program's features and time to decide whether to participate.
Although employers might wish for more tax law flexibility in
designing the retirement benefit component of their phased
retirement programs, the model now in place has many features
the corporate employer might find attractive. All in all, it seems to
provide a careful balancing of the needs of both employers and
employees. As a result, phased retirement programs, at least for
faculty, are becoming an accepted employee benefits program in
the academic community.

III. SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In the introduction, the following objectives for phased
retirement programs were listed: 1) a flexible compensation and
benefits (both pension and welfare) structure; 2) reasonable and
predictable costs, minimal administrative responsibilities, and
legal protection against claims for age discrimination for the
employer; 3) full disclosure and informed consent for the employee;
and 4) maintenance of current law protections for older workers,
particularly for those who must work out of financial necessity.
Achieving all these objectives in the current legal climate is not
feasible. Benefit laws are complicated and rigid, and they are
designed to serve objectives that often conflict with the needs of
phased retirement programs. Even piecemeal reform will be
difficult until there is a consensus on the appropriate scope of
these programs and the legal changes required to implement
them. There are no simple and easy reforms available that would
bring immediate, meaningful progress in the development of
phased retirement programs.
The
following
recommendations
therefore
take
an
incremental approach. First, this section discusses some reforms
that could be achieved relatively easily through additional
regulatory guidance.
Next, it describes some relatively noncontroversial statutory changes that have a reasonable chance of
passage. More systematic and comprehensive reforms are then
considered, using existing early retirement programs as a
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reference point. Finally, some long-term benefits issues that affect
both older and younger workers and require more fundamental
reform of ERISA are briefly addressed.
A. Regulatory Guidance
Regulatory guidance is an obvious starting point for reform.
This requires no real changes in law or new legislation. It only
requires regulatory authorities to provide more information on
their position regarding a particular legal issue. In terms of
phased retirement programs, more substantive guidance on the
following issues would be invaluable:
1.

When does a bona fide terminationof employment occur?

This is a critical issue for phased retirement programs
because it determines when distributions can be made from
pension plans. The "facts and circumstances" approach taken by
the IRS on this issue is not helpful and has led to widespread
disregard of the law. Until employers have some clear guidelines,
compliance with this basic benefits rule will be low because there
is no real risk of enforcement action. The IRS could provide some
guidance by issuing guidelines describing a number of safe harbor
scenarios or by discussing more fully the factors employers should
consider. This would provide some reassurance and reinforcement
for the careful employer while reining in some of the more abusive
practices such as the retire/rehire charade or bogus consulting
agreements that are common today.
2. How is final averagepay calculated for part-time employees?
The IRS needs to clarify this issue. Phased retirement
programs are not attractive to employees in defined benefit plans
whose benefits are based in part on their salary averaged over the
years closest to retirement. Switching to part-time employment
close to normal retirement age will have adverse consequences for
their ultimate retirement benefits.
The IRS has recently
suggested that it is impermissible to reduce an employee's already
accrued benefits in a final average pay plan when compensation
decreases.
This issue has significance far beyond phased
retirement programs. Most benefits practitioners and employers
are not aware of this position, and reducing benefits is a common
practice. So if this is the IRS's position, it is critical that the IRS
discloses and publicizes the legal basis for this position. It is hard
to overemphasize the importance of additional guidance from the
IRS on this issue, because it not only affects the qualified status of
most final average pay plans, but also the retirement income of
millions of participants as well.
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B. Statutory Changes
A number of statutory changes have recently been suggested
to remove some of the perceived obstacles, largely in tax law,,to
the development of phased retirement programs.
These are
relatively non-controversial but their implications for pension
policy over the long-term have really not been explored. Some of
the alternatives are to:
1. Permit distributionsfrom pension plans before normal
retirement age.
The Phased Retirement Liberalization Bill introduced into
Congress last year would repeal the current restriction on
distributions in defined benefit plans that are in effect for those
who elect to terminate employment before the normal qualifying
retirement age.78 In its place, a new rule would permit employees
to begin distributions without terminating employment after they
reach the earliest of normal retirement age, age fifty-nine and onehalf or thirty years of service." This would remove one of the
major obstacles to phased retirement programs now present in
defined benefit plans. But the bill also raises a number of
important concerns because adding a distribution option to a
defined benefit plan has financial implications for both employers
and employees. Would it apply to only current employees or to
terminated, vested participants too? What reduction factors would
apply to these benefits and could they be subsidized? What effect
would they have on early retirement benefits? Would it apply to
money purchase pension plans as well? Is it good pension policy to
increase the outflow of benefits before normal retirement age? The
private pension system already has a problem with "leakage," that
is, with retirement benefits being consumed before actual
retirement.7 ' This bill addresses one of the fundamental problems
facing phased retirement programs and it also raises a number of
important issues that should be studied further.

76. See supra note 14.
77. Id.

78. There is considerable evidence that many employees who withdraw
funds from their employers' retirement plans spend them rather than roll
them over into an IRA. See, e.g., Leonard Burman, Norma Coe & William
Gale, What Happens When You Show Them the Money: Lump Sum
Distributions,Retirement Income Security and Public Policy, (Urban Institute
Nov. 1999); Paul Yakoboski, Retirement Plans, Personal Saving and Saving

Adequacy, EBRI Issue Brief, No. 219, Mar. 2000; James Poterba, Stephen
Venti & David Wise, Pre-Retirement Cashouts and Foregone Retirement
Savings: Implications for 401(k) Asset Accumulation (NBER Working Paper,
W7314, Aug. 1999).
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2. Permit distributionsfrom 401(k) plans before age fifty-nine and
one-half
It is a tax law anomaly that employees in profit-sharing plans
can routinely obtain distributions of their employers' contributions
but must wait until age fifty-nine and one-half to access their own.
This rule prevents many younger employees from participating in
phased retirement programs if they intend to rely on their own
savings to supplement their income for part-time work. The
rationale for this rule is not quite clear, but it presumably is
intended to reduce leakage and to ensure that the tax advantages
available under 401(k) plans flow only to long-term savings.
Should such goals be imbedded in tax law? To some degree, the
restrictions reflect the paternalistic worry that people will spend
irresponsibly without them.
Their removal would encourage
earlier transitions from full-time employment to part-time
employment and complete retirement. The focus of this paper is
on providing more employment flexibility at later ages and
therefore, removing the restrictions at this time is not a high
priority. This might be reconsidered at a later date, however,
especially if there is an explicit decision to reduce the tax burden
on income more generally and to increase it on consumption by
treating all saving more generously.
3.

Liberalizepension distributionsafter normal retirement age.

Under current law, employers control the timing of payments
from pension plans.
Even if employees work after normal
retirement age, they may not be entitled to receive benefits until
they actually retire.
In some cases where plans apply the
suspension of benefits rules, employees lose benefits if they
continue to work while in other cases employees receive adjusted
benefits, but only at full retirement. A good argument can be
made that after normal-retirement-age employees who continue to
work should have the same access to their benefits as retirees.
Implementing such a change requires repealing the suspension of
benefits rules, changing rules on the timing of payments, and
requiring fair actuarial adjustments for all delayed payments.
These changes will increase plan costs for employers. On the
other hand, giving employees the option to choose when their
benefits begin, and ensuring that they are not penalized
financially for continued work, seem like reasonable steps toward
making work after normal retirement age more attractive.
4. Provide employees with more benefits information near
retirement age.
Employers are now required to give employees a great deal of
information about their benefits. However, that information does
not necessarily help an employee trying to decide whether to retire
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or to continue to work. It makes sense to require employers to
provide more information that is both personalized and targeted to
the retirement decision. For example, it would be helpful to
employees if they were told each year how much additional accrual
they would receive from their defined benefit plans for an
additional year of work. In addition, employees entering phased
retirement arrangements should receive full disclosure on the
benefits they are foregoing, as well as receiving, from continued
work.
Requiring such disclosure does not impose a large
administrative or financial burden on an employer because, in
most cases, the necessary information is already routinely
available.
5. Rationalize the penalty tax regime.
The Code imposes a ten percent penalty tax, in addition to
regular income tax, on distributions made before an employee
reaches age fifty-nine and one-half."9 Exceptions in the rule shield
distributions made in the form of annuities, the most common
form of distribution from a defined benefit plan.80 Lump sum and
installment distributions, the typical forms of distribution from a
defined contribution plan, are fully subject to the tax.8' This rule
has two rationales: to discourage leakage and to raise revenue. In
terms of phased retirement programs, it represents another
disincentive to participation for younger workers who intend to
rely on their defined contribution plans for supplemental income.
The issue is identical to that raised by restrictions on 401(k)
distributions. Although the focus of this paper is not on younger
workers, it seems reasonable to retain the penalty tax regime for
now.
C. A More Comprehensive Proposal
The regulatory changes proposed above and the ability to
receive pensions before the normal retirement age will make
phased retirement programs marginally easier for both employers
and employees. It is hard to escape the conclusion, however, that
explicit statutory authority for phased retirement programs will be
required before they can become a routine employee benefit. The
age discrimination issues are too difficult and pension law is too
rigid, complex, and counterproductive for any easy solutions. In
many ways, the difficulties confronting phased retirement
programs are very similar to those facing early retirement
programs a decade ago. To resolve those issues, all three major
benefit laws-the Code, ERISA, and ADEA-were amended to
79. I.R.C. §72(t)(2)(A)(i) (2002).
80. I.R.C. §72(t)(2)(A)(iv) (2002).
81. I.R.C. §72(t)(1) (2002).
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make early retirement programs feasible.82 The same could be
done for phased retirement programs even though their legal
issues are in many respects more difficult. The initial step would
be to:
1.

Create a statute authorizingphased retirementprograms.

Using the present ADEA early retirement statute as a model
and taking into account the innovative plan designs now found in
DROP plans and faculty retirement incentive plans, a phased
retirement program statute would have the following central
features. It would:
" provide legal protection to employers against ADEA claims;
" ensure the continued qualified status of retirement plans;
" set standards if certain benefits are required to be provided,
if any, as well as for any benefit reductions;
" minimize the administrative responsibility of the employer;
" provide disclosure and informed consent standards for
employees;
• permit employers to offer short-term plans;
" provide employers with more flexibility on eligibility, both in
terms of age and income.
2.

Permit safe harborbenefits and plans.

In addition to providing employers with general legal
principles for creating phased retirement programs, the statute
could also authorize specific safe harbor benefits and plan designs.
Safe harbors provide employers with certainty that their plan
designs satisfy all legal requirements.
This is an important
consideration in benefit law where legal standards are generally
extremely inflexible.
For example, adding late retirement
provisions to a defined benefit plan is currently both legally risky
and prohibitively expensive for employers. But a safe harbor
authorizing separate benefit accrual standards just for phased
retirees might be very attractive to employers. Safe harbors could
also benefit special retirement plans just for phased retirees. In
addition, the statute could define a safe harbor basic benefits
package that, if made available to phased retirees, would permit
employers to exclude them when testing their plans for nondiscrimination under Code rules. A phased retirement statute
with safe harbors represents an opportunity to restore some
flexibility to benefit law, provided it authorizes and encourages
employers to experiment with innovative benefits packages while
safeguarding the interests of employees. Such a statute, for
example, could:
82. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (2000); I.R.C § 1.401(a)(4)-4(d)(3) (2002)
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" provide safe harbors that lessen regulatory restrictions to
permit more innovative plan designs such as DROP plans;
" permit special plans and benefits packages just for phased
retirees;
" add late retirement features to defined benefit plans;
* define a basic benefits package that permits complying plans
to exclude phased retirees from tax law non-discrimination
tests;
" exclude phased retirees from non-discrimination testing
under 401(k) plans.
One drawback to using the current statutes as models is that
each requires employers to provide additional consideration, such
as enhanced benefits to participants. Employers seem to accept
this requirement when it benefits highly-favored employees such
as faculty or reduces their other costs through employment
terminations. Employers, however, may not be willing to do this
for large numbers of employees who are continuing to be paid
while accruing additional benefits.
As a result, a phased
retirement statute may require a different incentive structure if it
is to appeal to employers. On the other hand, many employers
might believe that retaining or obtaining experienced, valued
employees is worth the price of some additional, not necessarily
lavish, fringe benefits, provided they have some flexibility in
designing a benefits package that fits their own needs as well as
those of phased retirees.
D. A Longer-Term Issue
From an employee's perspective, many of the disincentives in
phased retirement programs have nothing to do with age, and
have everything to do with part-time work. Part-time workers
receive proportionately fewer (if any) benefits-both welfare and
pension-than their full-time co-workers.
Phased retirees
frequently find that by reducing their hours they lose a
disproportionate share of their fringe benefits. This practice has
long been sanctioned by ERISA. ERISA, however, was enacted
over twenty-five years ago when the model employment pattern
was the nine-to-five job and long-term service with a single
employer.
Perhaps phased retirement programs can serve as a vanguard
for revisiting the treatment of part-time work under ERISA. With
respect to pension plans, ERISA has an "all or nothing" standard.
In general, employees who work at least 1,000 hours a year are
entitled to be eligible for pension benefits. Employees who work
less may be and are generally excluded from their employer's
pension plans. Their only alternative for accumulating retirement
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income is to make their own contributions to an IRA. ERISA fails
to provide even a minimum-hours standard for health and other
Although many employers do provide these
fringe benefits.
benefits routinely, they also often exclude part-time workers from
their health, disability, and life insurance benefit programs as
well. This leaves part-time workers in the position of having to
purchase often-costly individual benefit policies, if they can even
afford such benefits, because they are not permitted access to the
less expensive group insurance market.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The labor market has changed a great deal since ERISA was
passed. New work arrangements such as "flex-time", "telecommuting", or "just-in-time worker" hiring policies are bringing
valuable flexibility to the workforce and the workplace. But
ERISA is incapable of facilitating the benefits issues posed by such
creative work arrangements because its fundamental statutory
framework is static, inflexible, and uncreative. Phased retirement
programs raise many of the same issues that flexible work policies
must confront. Similarly, these programs provide a test case for
developing a new consensus between employers and employees
over the appropriate treatment of less than full-time work. By
working through the benefits issues for phased retirees, the
development of phased retirement programs-whether through a
special statute or by adding flexibility to existing law-should help
to modify ERISA to meet the needs of the twenty-first century
workplace.

